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Pandora9s War: The Multi-Dimensional Nature of the Yugoslav Conflicts 
Slobodan Drakulic 
This paper is an attempt to define the 
general nature of armed conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia. First, is there a sin- 
gle, and then perhaps polycentric 
Yugoslav war, or several successive or 
concurrent wars? Second, is that war, 
or those wars, civil, international, eth- 
nic, religious, or something else-a 
combination of two, three, or all four of 
the above characteristics? Third, why 
did the war break out? And fourth, 
who was right and who was wrong in 
waging it? 
The answer to the first question de- 
termines the answer to the second one. 
If there is only one war in the former 
Yugoslavia, then it should be viewed 
as a polycentric armed conflict. That 
premise leads to the conclusion that we 
are dealing with a Yugoslav civil war 
fought between several antagonists, 
and assuming different forms in di- 
verse parts of that multicultural 
country. 
Such interpretation establishes the 
interconnectedness of the successive 
armed conflicts in three out of six 
former Yugoslav republics. It high- 
lights the conflict as war of all against 
one-predominantly Croat, Muslim 
and Slovene against the mostly Serb 
forces. At the same time, it reduces the 
significance of local, autochthonous 
factors, picturing them as derivatives 
of the Yugoslav federal politics. It even 
maintains an illusion that Yugoslavia 
may still exist somehow-perhaps as a 
commonwealth of battlefields. 
The Yugoslav republics were dis- 
tinct and even partially separate ethnic 
societies and states even before the 
outbreak of the war. The only excep- 
tion was Bosnia and Herzegovina, that 
miniature Yugoslavia which encapsu- 
lates the very core of the contradictions 
that ripped Yugoslavia apart--ethnic- 
ity based upon religion that produces 
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an ethnic society governed by an eth- 
nic state guided by the political doc- 
trine of ethnocracy. 
At the end of the eighties, Yugosla- 
via was loose even by the confederal 
standards, and it entered the nineties 
as a disorderly society and a disar- 
rayed state. That looseness of Yugosla- 
via opened sufficient space for 
autochthonous movements and ten- 
dencies to develop in the federal re- 
publics, and at once reduced the 
degree to which anything, including 
war, could be Yugoslav in nature or in 
scope. 
The series of armed conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia could not be de- 
fined as a Yugoslav civil war. There 
simply was not enough Yugoslavia- 
in terms of both state and the people- 
for a Yugoslav civil war. The only 
Yugoslav state institution left in place 
was the moribund Yugoslav People's 
Army, and the only people ready to 
fight for Yugoslavia were the Serbs of 
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
backed by the Serb nationalists of 
Serbia. 
Yugoslav federal army soon was 
reduced to one of the Serb armies in the 
former Yugoslavia, composed mostly 
of the Croatian, and Bosnia-Herzego- 
vinian Serbs (Kruselj, 32). By the 
Spring of 1992 it was entirely replaced 
by the local Serb armies, whose politi- 
cal leaderships neither could nor 
would fight for Yugoslavia. They had 
to chose between fighting for a Greater 
Serbia, or for their separate statelettes. 
They immediately opted for the first 
goal. Serbian leaders could not dare to 
accept invitations from their western 
cousins to annex their lands to Serbia, 
because of the severe opposition of the 
mainly Western foreign powers. 
The image of Serbs fighting the rest 
of the former Yugoslavs tends to over- 
shadow the existence of a number of 
other conflicts that happened within 
the heterogeneous anti-Serb camp. In 
one such episode Slovenian troops oc- 
cupied two small areas of Croatia in 
1991, and it took a while before they 
pulled out (Tudjman, 36). In Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, a vicious war took 
place between the Croat and Muslim 
armed forces in 1993-94. By the time it 
was stopped by a resolute diplomatic 
intervention of the belligerents' inter- 
national patrons, Croat forces were 
defeated in Central Bosnia, and Mus- 
lim forces in the old regional capital of 
Herzegovina, Mostar, were reduced to 
an enclave between the Croat forces to 
the west, and Serb forces in the east. 
Beneath the dividing lines marked by 
ethnicity and religion, the Croatian 
Council of Defense militia (the 
Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats' 
armed force) ambushed and killed 
members of the Croatian Defense 
Forces (the party militia of the extreme 
nationalist Croatian Party of Rights). 
On the Muslim side, a civil war still 
goes on between the (Muslim) Army of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the (Mus- 
lim) People's Defense Force of the au- 
tonomous province of Western 
Bosnia-led by Fikret Abdic, based in 
the provincial capital of Kladusa, and 
the government in Sarajevo accuses 
the Serbs of backing the West Bosnian 
Muslim rebels. 
Since ethnic lines are not the only 
lines of division, the number of mili- 
tary formations exceeds the number of 
majbr ethnic groups everywhere ex- 
cept in Slovenia, where only two po- 
litical subjects and two armed forces 
involved in the war: Slovenian and 
Yugoslav states and armed forces. In 
stark contrast to that; there were three 
major political subjects and about a 
dozen armed forces involved in the 
war in Croatia: the Republic of Croatia, 
Republic of Serb Krajina and Yugoslav 
Federation, with their assorted armed 
forces and militias (Gow, 18). The 
number of major political subjects rose 
to six in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Re- 
public of Croatia and the Croat Repub- 
lic of Herceg-Bosna; Republic of 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina (Izetbegovic) 
and the autonomous province of West- 
ern Bosnia (Abdic); Republic of Srpska 
(Serb Bosnia andHerzegovina) and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Ser- 
bia and Montenegro). The number of 
armed forces went down, indicating 
certain stabilization of various state 
authorities on the ground. Five armed 
forces confront each other in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina: two Croat, two 
Muslim and one Serb.' 
War in Slovenia is therefore the clos- 
est to being a civil war-an ethnic-civil 
war, the Slovenian war of secession 
from Yugoslavia. Religious hues were 
present but not prominent. Slovenia 
claimed that it was invaded by the 
Yugoslav People's Army.= The 
Croatian war is a mixture of the 
Croatian war of secession from Yugo- 
slavia, and Serb war of secession from 
Croatia: it thus started as a Yugoslav 
civil war, but ended as Croatian. As it 
was fought among ethnic societies 
governed by ethnic states and inspired 
by an ideology of ethnocracy, that war 
took the form of an ethnic war. And as 
the embattled ethnicities are entwined 
with religion in those parts (Smith, 27), 
their war became an ethno-religious 
war.3 
War in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
started as the joint Croat-Muslim war 
of secession from Yugoslavia, coun- 
tered by the Serb war of secession from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. An addi- 
tional momentum was the Croat war 
of secession from Bosnia and Herze- 
govina-opposed by the Muslim 
forces. Western Muslim war of seces- 
sion from Kladusa came as a final 
stroke on this chaotic martial canvass. 
Ironically, the almost surrealistic re- 
bellion against the state that is no more, 
actually provides the only possible di- 
mension of a truly civil war in the 
whole conflict. Namely, that Mr. 
Abdic's faction politically disagrees 
with the pro-Islamic faction of Mr. 
Izetbegovic, in spite of their common 
ethnic identity; all other sides in the 
Yugoslav conflicts politically disagree 
because of their ethnic differences." 
A civil war waged between differ- 
ent ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic so- 
ciety would end up being an ethnic 
war. Similarly, every would-be ethnic 
war fought between opposing ethnici- 
ties based on religions would end up 
being religious war-at least to some 
 degree."^ summarize briefly: first, 
the armed conflicts in Yugoslavia do 
not constitute a single Yugoslav civil 
war; second, those wars are a complex 
mixture of ethnic, religious, civil, and 
international armed struggles. Far 
from being a specie of Clausewitz's 
kind of war as continuation of politics 
by other means, they are a series of 
chaotic martial ruptures-Pandora's 
wars. 
Why did these wars break out? The 
first and most obvious reason is that 
the moribund nature of the Yugoslav 
regime of the time-product of dec- 
ades of ethnic squabbles and divisions 
that began in the late sixties. Those eth- 
nic squabbles and divisions in turn 
promoted internal ethnic homogeniza- 
tion. This process was particularly in- 
tensified after the death of the late 
Yugoslav President Tito, in 1980. By 
1990, all ethnic groups were virtually 
transformed into separate political- 
military camps and coalitions of such 
camps. The level of the political con- 
sensus within them was expressed in 
the series of plebiscites, referenda, 
elections, and the population census. 
Ethnic Serbs of Croatia sought to 
pre-empt the Croat secession from 
Yugoslavia with their own separation 
from Croatia. At their plebiscite in 
August 1990, the results were as fol- 
lows: "for autonomy 567,127; against 
114; 46 ballots were spoiled (Bisic, 63). 
Croatian Serb consensus around the 
issue of separation from Croatia, if 
Croatia were to separates from Yugo- 
slavia, was the highest of all ethnic ho- 
mogenizations at the time. 
Slovenian government proclaimed 
independence from Yugoslavia fol- 
lowing a popular plebiscite on the is- 
sue, where 86 percent of voters 
supported the idea of an independent 
Slovenian state in December of 1990 
(Nakarada, 136). By that time, homog- 
enization of the ethnic Slovene public 
opinion as anti8erb and anti-Yugo- 
slav had reached the point of no return. 
In May of 1991, Croatian government 
made its final move before the act of 
secession, calling a referendum. More 
than 93 percent of all Croatians who 
cast their ballot, voted for their repub- 
lic's sovereignty and independence 
from Yugoslavia (Separovic, 115-17).6 
Seven percent more than the ethnically 
far more homogenous Slovenians had 
cast in December 1990. 
On February 29 and March 1,1992, 
"some sixty-eight percent of all eligi- 
ble voters voted in favour of independ- 
ence," (Fogelquist, 26), at a plebiscite 
suggested by the European Commu- 
nity and called by the Croat-Muslim 
coalition's leadership. Most Serbs ab- 
stained, obviously. If their numbers 
were to be subtracted from the total, 
virtually all adult Croats and Muslims 
voted for secession. Taken on their 
own, virtually all Serbs voted against 
secession. 
Finally, on March 1, 1992, "in the 
referendum in Montenegro, the major- 
ity of the people came out for a union of 
Montenegro and Serbia" (Djuretic, 
445). The cycle of ethnic homogeniza- 
tion was thus completed? As the pas- 
sions ran high for years before, the 
assorted Yugoslav political-military 
camps and coalitions were ready to 
clash. Pandora's box was brimming 
with wars. 
At that point in time, there was no 
major ethnic group left in Yugoslavia 
which was not politically homog- 
enized around an ideological political 
consensus already established by the 
ethno-nationalist Communists, and 
hardened by the new political elites 
that conquered the state power in 
1990.8 All those elites were leaning to- 
wards pronounced ethno-nationalist 
stands that were about to throw the 
country into war. 
All that was needed by the begin- 
ning of the nineties, was someone to 
merely touch upon someone else's sore 
psychohistoric spot, and things would 
take the course towards confrontation. 
No such thing happened in Yugosla- 
via. Nobody touched anybody's sore 
spot: they trampled upon them when- 
ever and wherever they could, with 
both feet stuck into military boots. 
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Take for example the phonogram of 
a secret meeting held on July 23,1990, 
of the President of Croatia, Franjo 
Tudjman and his advisor, Slaven 
Letica, with the leader of Croatian 
Serbs of the time, Jovan Raskovic. At 
one point, Raskovic says: "I have also 
pleaded to you to mention the 
sovereignty of the Serb national being. 
That is not a state sovereignty of any 
kind, when you say that sovereignty of 
the Serb national being is being 
recognized . . . ." President Tudjman re- 
sponded: "Those are legal formula- 
tions." His advisor Letica added: "That 
cannot be improvised. Croatia is the 
national state of the Croats" (Letica, 
154), (Raskovic, 312). 
Gypsies and Jews (mostly), and Serbs. 
This was one of the particularly sore 
spots of both Serbs and Croats, repeat- 
edly entered by Mr. Tudjman in his ca- 
pacity of a revisionist historian of the 
World War I1 horrors (Babic, 79).9 
Croat propagandists retorted by 
means of books like the one edited by 
Boze Covic and titled The Origins of the 
Great-Serbian Aggression, proving that 
Serb intellectuals and politicians had 
aimed to attack Croatia ever since 1844 
(Covic, IZvori).l0 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija 
Iztbegovic's Islamic Declaration was 
published in 1990 (two odd decades 
after having been written), subtitled 
"A Programme for the Islamization of 
Why did these wars break out? The first and most obvious reason 
is that the moribund nature of the Yugoslav regime of the time-- 
product of decades of ethnic squabbles and divisions 
that legan in the late sixties. 
The issue at stake was definition of 
the state of Croatia in the new Consti- 
tution that was then being prepared. 
Croat ruling party wanted to define it 
in Letica's terms. Most Croatian Serbs 
insisted that they should be mentioned 
as a co-sovereign people of Croatia. 
Letica's blunt definition of Croatia 
did not enter the Constitution (Consti- 
tution, 31), but it entered the corpus of 
the casus belli. About a month earlier, 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic of- 
fered his contribution to the brewing 
war: "Serbia should let it be clearly 
known that it takes its present admin- 
istrative borders only in connection 
with a federally constituted Yugosla- 
via," and "in case that such a Yugosla- 
via is not wanted, the issue of Serbia's 
borders is an open question" (Cavoski, 
136-37). What was not accomplished 
by the politicians had been achieved 
by the propagandist intellectuals. In 
the first half of 1991, before the Slov- 
enian and Croatian declarations of in- 
dependence, Petar Dzadzic published 
the third expanded edition of his book 
The New Ustasha State?, relating Franjo 
Tudjman to the Nazi Croat Fiihrer in 
1941-45, Ante Pavelic, responsible for 
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of 
Muslims and the Muslim Peoples" 
(Izetbegovic, 3). I am not sure that Mr. 
Izetbegovic's political theology could 
have impressed very many largely 
religiously indifferent Bosnian Mus- 
lims. I do know that its publishing was 
successfully used for the Serb ethnic 
mobilization against the Islamic 
fundamentalist revival of Alija 
Izetbegovic, promoted by the Serbian 
media. 
Slovenian media churned their own 
"flowers of political and intellectual 
evil," like everybody else. One of the 
protagonists of the Slovene new social 
movements, Tomaz Mastnak, an- 
nounced:" I see no solution and have 
ceased looking for one," (Mastnak, 48) 
in a situation where Yugoslavia was 
split into "two opposing models of so- 
cial and political development . . . one 
Slovenian and the other Serbian" 
(Mastnak, 46). The period of 1989-91 
could be defined as one protracted 
psychosocial preparation for war--on 
all sides without exceptions. 
The remaining question is the one of 
right and wrong involved in these 
wars. By late June 1991, when war 
erupted in Slovenia, a low-level war- 
fare was already going on in Croatia 
since August of 1990. According to the 
local ethnic Serb sources, it all started 
on "August 17,1990 [at the Northern 
Dalmatian municipality of] Benko- 
vac," after the "Ministry of Internal 
Affairs of Croatia sent its special troops 
to prevent the plebiscite," due to be 
held within two days. "Serbs re- 
sponded by erecting barricades," and 
the "war for Krajina started" (Bisic, 
63)?l Another Serb source from Bel- 
grade states that "the 'Serb uprising' in 
the Knin Krajina12 practically started," 
as a "response to a night attack of the 
  special^"^ against the militia14 station 
in Benkovac" (Nakarada, 135). 
The ethnic Croat sources reported 
the same event very differently. Well 
known Croat writer Dubravko Jelcic 
wrote in his diary that "military planes 
intercepted the official helicopters of 
the Ministry of Interior of Croatia, forc- 
ing them to return to theirbase," which 
is how "an open attack on Croatia 
started." (Jelcic, 254-55). Another 
Croat wrGer maintained that the 
,Serbo-Croat standoff in the area of 
Knin was "planned in the Serbian ideo- 
logical centres;" local Serbs, "encour- 
aged by two MIGs in the sky and 
meetings of support in Serbia, actually 
declared war on Croatia" (Cuic, 9). 
That was a fact confirmed by the 
other side in the conflict as well. On 
August 17,1990, the President of Knin 
municipality, Milan Babic, proclaimed 
the state of war on the local radio. The 
last President of YugoslaJia and 
Croatian separatist Stipe Mesic 
cracked a joke about this incident, say- 
ing that "Mr. Babic must be a big joker 
when he thinks that President of a 
municipality can proclaim the state of 
war." Dubravko Jelcic who preserved 
Mr. Mesic's pun for posterity, com- 
mented about his own reaction to the 
joke: "I laughed from my heart and 
immediately felt the power of humour: 
what has once been ridiculed, cannot 
be serious, let alone lofty, any more" 
(Jelcic, 255). 
On the contrary, something can be 
deadly serious, regardless of how 
much it may have been ridiculed by its 
opponents. Mr. Babic's declaration of 
war may have been pathetic, but the 
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fact remains that the President of the 
thinly inhabited badlands which is the 
municipality of Knin, was right: the 
war in former Yugoslavia started on 
August 17,1990 in Benkovac, Croatia; 
if one prefers to talk about more than 
one war, than this was the first in the 
series, and it started with Mr. Babic's 
proclamation of the state of war in 
Knin. 
That initial stage of the armed con- 
flict is marked by the Croatian seces- 
sion from Yugoslavia, and Serbian 
resistance to it, which manifested itself 
as the local Serb secession from 
Croatia. As two sides in this conflict 
were indigenous to Croatia, theirs was 
a civil war. Furthermore, as Croatia 
and all participants in the Croatian 
conflict at least formally belonged to 
Yugoslavia, that war was not ethnic, 
but civil as well. After the international 
recognition of Croatia as an independ- 
ent state, that war became interna- 
tional and remained such until the 
Yugoslav Army's pull-out from its 
territory. 
The Slovene state leadership hence 
faced a situation where an armed con- 
flict was already in full motion in 
Croatia, involving ethnic Croat-led 
and dominated forces on one side, and 
equally ethnic Serb forces on the other. 
Slovenian leaders watched the federal 
army as it vacillated between an 
untenable neutrality and growing 
sympathies with the Croatian Serbs by 
most of its mostly Serb and Monte- 
negrin, as well as mostly pro-Yugoslav 
federalist Communist professional 
military officers. They should have 
had no illusions about the side that 
those same officers would chose in an 
armed conflict in Slovenia. 
One should bear in mind that Slov- 
enia was the primary battleground 
between the increasingly ethno-na- 
tionalist and separatist Slovenian new 
social movements, and the steadfastly 
federalist Yugoslav People Army's of- 
ficer corps. Slovenia's Minister of De- 
fence since 1990, Janez Jansa, was one 
of the four people put on tried for trea- 
son in 1988, by a military tribunal, after 
rendering public some military docu- 
ments of highly disputable impor- 
tance, to say the least, that were 
stamped as "strictly confidential" by 
some anonymous and probably un- 
concerned military bureaucrat. 
That trial seems to have been the 
breaking point in the relationship be- 
tween the mainstream ethnic Slovene 
population and the Yugoslav regime, 
and particularly its military authori- 
ties. This is was indicated at the time by 
the Slovene political analyst Darko 
Strajn, who asked whether any change 
at all could be affected within the exist- 
ent framework (Grakalic, 146-48). The 
implication is obvious: if no reform 
was possible, the Slovene new social 
movements would have to give up 
their aspirations, or make a dash for 
the political revolution. They opted for 
the latter, backed by their state and 
party apparatus during the Commu- 
nist regime. Their struggle was contin- 
ued by the new separatist regime that 
bore even some clericalist-nationalist 
hues. 
With such sharply antagonistic 
forces dominating their respective ar- 
eas of the political spectrum of the 
former Yugoslavia, war became in- 
creasingly unavoidable. The sparkwas 
purposely provided by the Slovenian 
government, and set to the Yugoslav 
tinderbox by its Ministry of Defense 
(Jansa, 155).15 Mr. Jansa's passionate 
struggle to start a war in Slovenia met 
an equally zealous response from his 
government's opponents in Belgrade. 
Consequently, when the Slovenian 
Terfritorial Defence units took Yugo- 
slav border crossings to Italy, Austria 
and Hungary by force, federal Prime 
Minister Ante Markovic responded by 
ordering the federal army to retake 
them by force. The army rolled out in 
its armour-but with a vastly insuffi- 
cient infantry of less than two thou- 
sand soldiers-and swept the lightly 
armed Slovene militias aside. Most 
border crossings were back under the 
federal government's control within 
days. In the meantime, nine Slovenian 
militiamen were killed in the clashes 
(Jansa, 5); some scores of federal troops 
died on the other side (Bandi, 202); 
some foreigners were drawn into the 
maelstrom by the Slovenian troops- 
used as a human shield of a kind-and 
were killed by the federal forces 
(Molinari, SO), their number of ten be- 
ing only somewhat lower than that of 
the ethnic Slovenes (Bandi, 202). 
Within days, foreign powers inter- 
vened, offering mediation and asking 
for the cessation of hostilities. A stand- 
off followed, with Slovenian inde- 
pendence being suspended no more 
than the federal control over Slovenia 
evaporated into thin air. On July 1 
1991, the Serbian side was pressured 
by international factors to accept an 
ethnic Croat secessionist, Mr. Stipe 
Mesic, as the President of the Yugoslav 
federal Presidency. He thus became 
the head of the highest instance of state 
power in the country-formally a head 
of the collective supreme commander 
of the Yugoslav People's Army. 
Several days later, an accord be- 
tween the belligerents was signed at 
the late President Tito's resort at the 
Islands of Brioni (later on renamed by 
the Croatian state into Brijuni). The 
war in Slovenia was over-if it ever 
happened. What did happen, how- 
ever, was a series of low-scale clashes 
of no tactical significance, not to men- 
tion any strategic importance. 
An intensive propaganda war hap- 
pened instead, with Croatia and Slov- 
enia on one side, and the federal 
government, Montenegro and Serbia 
on the other. Croatian and Slovenian 
propagandists claimed that their coun- 
tries had suffered an aggression of the 
Yugoslav federal army, while the same 
army accused their Slovene antago- 
nists of high treason.19Botharguments 
were vacuous from the other's point of 
view, and, needless to say, both pro- 
tagonists practised an autistic form of 
political behaviour, utterly oblivious 
to anything beyond their obsessive 
goals. 
The fundamentally identical politi- 
cal process that led to the war in 
Croatia, was repeated in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. First Serbo-Muslim 
clashes occurred in the town of Foca, 
on September 11, 1990, less than a 
month after the first armed standoff in 
Croatia. For as long as the ethnically 
tripartite Presidency, Parliament and 
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government of the republic were in 
place, the balance of power kept the 
situation from a precipitous deteriora- 
tion. Gradual worsening of ethnic rela- 
tions continued nonetheless. 
The first free elections held in No- 
vember of 1990, confirmed the process 
of ethno-political homogenization. 
Electoral results actually looked like an 
ethnic census data: Muslim Party of 
Democratic Action won 86 seats in the 
new Parliament; Serb Democratic 
Party 72; Croat Democratic Commu- 
nity 44 (Nakarada, 136). 
By April of 1991, predominantly 
ethnic Serb region of Bosnian Krajina17 
founded its own Assembly (Parlia- 
ment (Nakarada, 139). In late October 
of 1991, an Assembly (Parliament) of 
the Serb people of Bosnia and Herze- 
govina was founded (Bisic, 66), in 
response to the mid-October Memo- 
randum on the Sovereign Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, adopted by the Croat- 
Muslim majority in the Parliament 
(Bisic, 65). In November, Serb people 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina held a 
plebiscite, expressing their intention to 
remain in Yugoslavia (Nakarada, 146). 
A month later, Government and Presi- 
dency of Bosnia and Herzegovina de- 
cided to seek recognition from the 
European Community-as an inde- 
pendent state. Serb representatives 
were outvotgd again, by the Croat- 
Muslim coalition (Bisic, 66). 
Then came the Croat-Muslim 
backed declaration of independence, 
wide international recognition, and 
breakup of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
allin thespring of 19%. What followed 
was almaelstrom of war, where yester- 
day's allies cut each others' civilians' 
throats or burned them alive in their 
homes. 
The lust of war+was on the loose as 
villainy marched under the ethnic 
flags, torturing, slaughtering, rapin& 
plundering, wrecking, even head- 
hunting.'* All in the name of the 
people, nation, gods, history,-free- 
dom--one vast collective endeavour 
inspired by ethnic hatred, and dedi- 
cated to the joy of wanton destruction. 
In a way, this Pandora's War is indeed 
beyon& good and evil. It is insane. 
If we discount the Croatian Defence Forces, 
which may have no future, especially hav- 
ing in view that several political and mili- 
tary leaders were already killed by other 
Croat forces under questionable circum- 
stances. 
Such claims were made by all sides, includ- 
ing the Serbs. For the Slovene story see 
Jansa; Croatian story can be found in Covic; 
Muslim story is told by Fogelquist; Serb 
story is in Djuretic; for Yugoslav federal 
story see Kadijevic. These are just examples, 
of course. 
I will leave alone the international dirnen- 
sions of the Ballcan conflicts, because such 
an attempt would require a comparative 
assessment of not only Yugoslav (Serbian 
and Montenegrin) role in them, but also the 
arming of Croatia and Slovenia by Ger- 
many, Austria and Hungary in 1990191, or 
the recent American a d  British involve- 
ment in the Balkan conflicts on the Muslim 
side, which is far too complex an issue for 
the scope of this paper. 
I am taking ethnic difference in the sense of 
subjective self-understanding, although I 
am fully aware of their concrete material 
and historical vacuousness. 
The issue of faith and religious sincerity is 
another matterwhichIcannot pyxsue in this 
paper. 
Let me note that the voting slip for sover- 
eignty and independence was blue, and rep- 
resented as a Croatian-Slovenian position; 
the other voting slip was red, it asked the 
voter to be for a "single federal country of 
~ u ~ o s l a v i a " - s u ~ ~ & t i n ~  unio  instead of 
federation-and it was represented as a Ser- 
bian-Montenegrin 
Here we encounter the much disputed issue 
of ethnicity of the Montenegrins. It seems to 
me that most of them were leaning towards 
closer ties with Serbia, ever since the mass 
uprising against the local Titoist epigones in 
198889 (Strugar, 41). To counterbalance 
Strugarls ~erbnationalist views, one can 
consult a Montenegrin independentist like 
Brkovic, for example. , 
Montenegro and Serbia went through a dif- 
ferent process, wherein former Communists 
quite swiftly converted to Serb nationalism in 
1987-89. Slobodan Milosevic is certainly the ' 
most famous example. Expounding anti-na- 
tionalist political viewpoint as late as Decem- 
ber 1986 (Milosevic, 126-28), he was a 
national-communist leader of Serbia by, the 
Spring of 1987 (Milosevic, 147-48, for exam- 
ple). His Montenegrin counterpart is Momir 
Bulatovic, who was pro-Yugoslav in 1989 
(Bulatovic, 37), but ended up clashing with 
Slovene leadership in 1991, as we can see from 
his letter to the Slovenian President Milan 
Kucan (Bulatovic, 21415). 
It was his historical revisionism and nation-, 
alism that turned Tudjman into a dissident, 
not his rather nebulous democratic orienta- 
tion (Babic, 83). 
10. Although terribly slanted, this is a valuable 
rourctbook of Serbo-Croat ethnic relations, 
nonetheless. 
11. MiliUlrgrcnz, V o j m  Kmjim, Military Frontier 
against the Ottoman Empire, demilitarized 
in 1881 and annexed to Croatia and Slov- 
enia. Namelv. Croatia was a "triune" kina- 
dom at thai.time, composed of ~roat ra  
(North-West), Slovenia (North-East), and 
Dalmatia (coastal regions). Dalmatia went 
Erombeing a Venetian possession for centu- 
ries, through a short French rule during 
Napoleon I, to being an Austrian territory 
until 1918, when it entered the Kingdom of 
the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, which in 
turn became Yugoslaviain 1929. A good and 
fair short history of the Military Frontier can 
be found in Roksandic. 
A medieval toponym refemng to the area 
around the municipality of Knin, in North- 
ern Dalmatia, pr&ntli capital of the self- 
proclaimed Republic of Serb Kraiina. 
Commando units of the Ministry of Interior 
of Croatia. 
Militia in this instance means the police. 
That "highest state secret" was "known by 
only a few people (expanded Presidency [of 
Slovenia], some members of the govern- 
ment, and the key operative personnel" 
(Jansa, 155). 
As both ministers of defense-Slovenian , 
and Yugoslavian-have published their 
memoirs, one may find it useful to compare 
their accounts of the events. See Jansa and 
Kadijevic in references. 
Western Bosnia, with the regional capital of 
Banja Luka. 
See Amnesty International and Helsinki 
Watch reports on the war crimes in Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina. About head- 
chopping, see Soldo. 
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